Telling a Stranger She’s “Fat,” “Lazy,” and “Trailer Trash” Doesn’t Mean Banning

From HB v. FKruled Monday by the California Court of Appeals (Supreme Court Judge Ruth Ann Kwan, joined by Justices Victoria Chavez & Brian Hoffstadt):

The purpose of the DVPA “is to prevent domestic violence, domestic violence, sexual violence and to provide for the separation of persons involved in domestic violence for a period of time sufficient to enable these persons to find solutions to the causes of the violence.” The DVPA is narrowly construed to achieve its objective.

The DVRO may provide it if the affidavit or evidence “shows, to the satisfaction of the court, clear evidence of past conduct or abuse.” Abuse includes physical harm, rape, or “fear of serious harm.” “It’s not just a physical injury or an assault.” Violation of the DVRO is punishable as a misdemeanor.

The court can enjoin “harassment, assault, battery, stalking, threats, rape, assault,” false pretenses, harassment, telephone calls, destruction of personal property, communication, access, and disturbing the peace of the other person. Disturbing the peace is behavior that “destroys the peace of mind or the feelings of another.” It includes “coercive control” that “unreasonably interferes with individual freedom of choice” such as seclusion; maintenance requirements; monitor or control its operations, quality, communications, finances, resources or access to services; or coercion by coercion or threat….

Courts have accepted that the DVPA can apply without injury or assault. In NT, the husband was under a temporary restraining order against harassing, stalking, or communicating with his wife, or disturbing her peace: When the TRO was in effect, he tried to discuss their relationship; refused to leave their son after visiting them; seeking intimacy; he followed him; he put a letter in his diaper bag; and he reached his secret place even though he was not allowed to find his address. The appeals court wrote that this “would have been abusive without the existence of a TRO” because it was a “clear violation” of the woman’s peace of mind.

The DVRO is valid if a spouse publicly discloses private emails in order to control, abuse and harass the petitioner to the detriment of his or her business and relationships, which “destroys the mental or emotional stability of the spouse.” When a relationship ends, keeping a person constantly connected to the computer and the computer, even if they are asked to stop, disturbs their peace of mind.

A DVRO can provide when the applicant shows bad behavior (instances of physical abuse and emotional abuse) and testifies that her husband is “an aggressive person capable of violence.” In Perez, his friend texted and called the applicant “many times,” said he was “going [to] salary” and broke into his house, which made him fear that he and his children would be safe.

Conversely, mentioning someone’s name—when there is no history of harassment, threats or ongoing harassment—does not constitute a DVRO. DVRO is inappropriate for a former colleague who called petitioner a “‘cold ass'” and a “‘damaged threat,'” when the trial court found that he was excited, angry or angry and should have “calmed down” but found that he was not. threats were made. The trial court stated that the conduct amounted to “‘very bad comments, . . .’ . . an argument, and in fact he did not stop and was abusing him.” The appeals court ruled that this was true. no torture….

The DVPA Does Not Apply Here

These records do not indicate physical harm, abuse or involvement in imminent serious injury. Also, there is no evidence to show that the appellant insulted, assaulted, assaulted, stalked, threatened HB or disturbed the peace. The court believed the testimony of the appellant that he did not act sexually or cause fear of HB by preventing him from walking. We defer to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. HB admitted that appellant “never put his hands on me.” The court did not find that the plaintiff used financial abuse or coercion.

The only basis for DVRO was [trial] The court found “harassment in this case, and this is based on it [appellant’s] admitting that he called the mother of his children ‘fat,’ ‘lazy,’ ‘car trash.’

The DVPA deals with abuse, not abuse. Calling the complainant’s name was disrespectful or insulting but not abusive under the DVPA…. [N]o Bullying is indicated by “‘very bad words'” during an argument or “‘insulting each other.’ If inappropriate language between a spouse and a partner is subject to a DVRO, courts may be defeated by plaintiffs seeking to restrict abusive communication or to prosecute. suppressing the idea that a man or woman is overweight or can do a good job cleaning the house. This is unacceptable.

HB showed no bad behavior—including a history of physical violence—or an onslaught of hundreds of harassing phone calls and text messages that caused widespread panic. Also, HB did not provide evidence showing that the plaintiff wrote “letters” to his friends and employers, or accused him of “frightening, annoying and distressing” things about himself to his children. place.

The clear language of the DVPA or the interpretation of the case law supports the provision of a DVRO. The court elevated the racial slur and trauma to domestic violence and aggravated assault under the DVPA….

Although the DVRO is not allowed to name names, the court has its own procedures to ensure that the children do not experience bad behavior, which was a major problem for the court. “It is certainly in the best interest of every child of divorce that the adults in their lives behave in a mature and respectful manner.” (In Candiotti’s Marriage (Cal. App. 1995) [former spouse has a First Amendment right to disparage her children’s stepmother to other adults, if it does not directly affect the children].)

“In family cases, the courts have the power to restrict speech in order to promote the welfare of the children. Thus, the courts always order the concerned parties not to speak insultingly about the other parent to their children or in front of their children.” (In Hartmann’s Marriage (Cal. App. 2010); Molinaro v. Molinaro (Cal. App. 2019) [the court may prevent spouses from disparaging each other in front of the children but prohibiting a spouse from posting about the divorce on-line is an unconstitutional prior restraint].) At this time, the court can order that the people not to insult or call them names in front of their children, without the necessity of DVRO.

We thank Yury Galperin (Galperin & Hensley), who represents her husband.

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